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Abstract—We study the problem of secure message multicast-
ing over graphs in the presence of a passive (node) adversary who
tries to eavesdrop in the network. We show that use of feedback,
facilitated through the existence of cycles or undirected edges,
enables higher rates than possible in directed acyclic graphs of
the same mincut. We demonstrate this using code constructions
for canonical combination networks (CCNs). We also provide
general outer bounds as well as schemes for node adversaries
over CCNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a source that would like to securely multicast
a message to a set of receivers in the presence of passive
adversaries. It is well known that over wireless networks, if
public feedback is available, we can support higher secrecy
rates than if it is not [1]. We explore in this paper whether the
same could be true over wired networks that are modeled as
graphs.
While security against eavesdropping has been extensively
examined (in a number of interesting works) in the network
coding literature, the potential utility of feedback as such has
not, as far as we know. Seminal works such as [2], [3] have
looked both at information theoretical bounds as well as code
constructions for the case of edge adversaries; works have also
started examining the case of node adversaries [4], [5]. In all
cases however the underlying network is modeled as a directed
acyclic graph.
Yet feedback is readily available in wired networks, and
could potentially help in secrecy. Many times connections
between sources and receivers are undirected or bi-directional;
even over directed graphs, we may have cycles, that offer a
form of feedback between network nodes. The existence of
such cycles could be put to good use to create for instance
common randomness between intermediate network nodes,
that a secrecy protocol could leverage to achieve higher rates.
We here provide a number of examples to establish that
this is indeed the case. We mainly consider node adversaries,
that tap a specific network node and intercept all incoming
messages, but also discuss edges adversaries. We focus on a
special class of (minimal) combination networks, that is often
used in the network coding literature, and the simplest possible
case, of a single node adversary. We derive outer bounds as
well as achievability schemes for the cases where feedback
is (and is not) available. We design schemes that employ
feedback, which can offer rates higher than outer bounds in
the case where feedback is not available. These results point
to the potential of using such feedback for network secrecy; a
topic of ongoing investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our
notation and basic notions; Section III examines feedback over
very simple abstracted examples. Section IV deals with inner
and outer bounds for directed acyclic graphs, mainly developed
for comparison purposes in this paper. Finally, Section V
shows the benefits of feedback in undirected and bidirected
graphs.
II. NOTATION AND SETUP
We model a wired network as a graph G = (V, E) with unit
capacity edges. A single source node has a messageW to send
to a set of receiversR ⊂ V . We are interested in deriving outer
bounds, as well as building N -round secure protocols with the
following constraints:
• Round : Each edge can be used at most once in a round.
• Decodability : All receivers perfectly decode message W
with zero error probability.
• Secrecy : H(W|VA) = H(W) where VA denotes the “view”
of an adversary A, i.e, the information available to tapped
edges or nodes during the protocol.
We say that such a protocol achieves
• Secrecy rate : H(W)N .
We distinguish between two types of passive adversaries :
• k-edge adversary : the adversary has access to an arbitrary
set of k edges.
• k-node adversary : the adversary has access to an arbitrary
set of k nodes. In this paper, we mainly focus on a 1-node
adversary.
We allow intermediate nodes to do operations over a finite
field F. We also assume that the network nodes share no
prior common randomness and no side secure communication
channel, they can only communicate through the network
graph that is subject to eavesdropping.
Canonical combination networks (CCNs): Our results
in this paper are over CCNs, that essentially are minimal1
combination networks, see [6], [4]. Figure 1 shows a directed
(m,h)-CCN with m ≥ h, where m is the number of coding
points and h the mincut to the receivers. It has a source S,
h trivial coding nodes A1, A2, . . . , Ah (with indegree one),
m − h non-trivial coding nodes Ah+1, Ah+2, . . . , Am (with
indegree h) and
(
m
h
)
receivers. Each receiver is connected to h
1Removing any edge reduces the mincut for at least one receiver.
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Fig. 1. Directed (m,h)-CCN.
nodes from the set {B1, B2, . . . , Bm}. An undirected (m,h)-
CCN can be obtained by replacing all the directed edges in
the directed (m,h)-CCN by undirected edges. We will also
consider a bidirected (m,h)-CCN which we create by adding
an edge (backward edge) in the reverse direction for every
edge (forward edge) in the directed (m,h)-CCN. Note that the
directed, undirected and bidirected networks all have mincut
h towards each receiver.
(a)Directed
S
R
S
R
S
R
S
R
C1 C2h h
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h
(c)Bidirected(b)Undirected (d )Bidirected with
node overlap
Fig. 2. Abstracted examples. The cut values are shown beside dotted lines
for (a), (b) and (c).
III. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLES
We consider the simple networks depicted in Figure 2,
where a single source S wants to securely send information
to a receiver R; we think of the edges in these networks as
abstracting edge-disjoint (and in the last case node-disjoint)
paths in larger networks. Our goal is to build basic intuition
on when feedback could be useful. For the first three examples
we assume a k-edge adversary, while for the last a 1-node
adversary.
Example in Figure 2(a): the outer bound on the secrecy
rate is h−k and is achievable. This follows trivially from [2].
Example in Figure 2(b): for this undirected graph the
outer bound remains h−k (proved below), and its achievability
follows from [2]. We can show the outer bound as follows.
We apply the “crypto-inequality” in [7] which states that
I(W, KS ;KR | UN ) = 0 (1)
whereW is the source message, KS is the private randomness
of the source, KR is the private randomness of the receiver
and UN denotes the values exchanged between the source
and receiver during any N -round protocol. Simply put, (1)
implies that (W, KS) and KR, which were independent to
begin with, remain independent even after conditioning on all
values exchanged during the protocol. For the graph in this
example,
H(W)
(a)
≤ I(W;UN1:hKR)
(b)
= I(W;UN1:h)
(c)
≤ N(h− k) (2)
where UN1:h denotes
2 values exchanged between the source and
receiver during the N -round protocol, (a) follows from the
decodability constraint, (b) follows from (1) and (c) follows
from the secrecy constraint.
Example in Figure 2(c): for this cyclic graph, if we have
h forward (from S to R) edges and q backward edges (from
R to S), the outer bound becomes min{h, h+ q − k} where
the bound h + q − k follows easily with similar steps as in
(2). The outer bound is achievable as follows. To achieve it,
when k ≤ q, we can send q random packets (keys) from R
to S using the backward edges, say r1, . . . , rq . The source
creates h linear combinations of these r-packets (using for
instance an MDS code), say s1, . . . , sh such that the r-
packets and the s-packets are in general position (any selection
of q of these packets are linearly independent). The source uses
the s-packets as one-time pads for the forward edges. With
this construction, an adversary observing any k edges will
not be able to retrieve information (proved below) and thus
secrecy rate h is achievable. For proof of secrecy, consider
a k-edge adversary who taps l backward edges and k − l
forward edges. From l backward edges it infers l r-packets
(say r1, . . . , rl). On the forward edges, the adversary observes
VA (after accounting for inferred packets r1, . . . , rl) as shown
below,
VA =

b1
b2
.
.
bk−l
+A

rl+1
rl+2
.
.
rq
 (3)
where b1, . . . , bk−l are information symbols (on k− l forward
edges) and matrixA is full rank (by construction of s-packets).
Now, H(b1, . . . , bk−l|VA) = H(b1, . . . , bk−l) since r-packets
are uniformly distributed, A is full rank and k ≤ q. We
can easily extend this scheme in the case where k > q, by
combining the previous scheme with the scheme in [2]: use
again the backward edges to convey random packets to the
source, have the source itself generate k − q random packets,
and combine these to create one-time pads to encode h−(k−q)
information messages to send to the receiver using secure
network coding (for more details see [2]).
2We use the notation UN1:h for U
N
1 , U
N
2 , . . . , U
N
h .
Example in Figure 2(d): for this bidirectional graph with
two intermediate nodes C1 and C2, we can achieve secrecy
rate 2 even if there is a 1-node passive adversary. To do so, the
receiver R can send keys k1 and k2 to the source S. Since C1
and C2 each observe only one of the keys, S can use k1+ k2
as a one-time pad for both the forward paths. If we now have
a network with h overlapping forward and backward paths
through intermediate nodes C1, C2, . . . , Ch (each forward path
has a node-overlap with only one backward path), secrecy rate
h is again achievable against a 1-node adversary using the
same approach (this will be a technique we will use for (m,h)-
bidirected CCN considered in a later section).
Intuition: These simple examples give a very intuitive
message: if we can use feedback (edges in backward direc-
tions, in cyclic graphs) without affecting the mincut, then this
can help to achieve higher3 secrecy rates. Essentially, we can
use the feedback to create common randomness. In Section V,
we show that this is indeed the case in more complex networks
with multiple receivers as well, where however more elaborate
schemes will be needed.
IV. DIRECTED CCN WITH 1-NODE ADVERSARY
In this section, we derive outer bounds and achievability
schemes for directed CCNs where a single node is compro-
mised and acts as a passive adversary. This is a case without
feedback, which we mainly develop for comparison purposes,
but we believe that these results are of independent interest.
We give first an outer bound and then achievability schemes
that match the outer bound in some cases.
Theorem 1: Consider a directed (m,h)-CCN with4 m ≥
h + 1. An outer bound on the secrecy rate against a 1-node
adversary is
(h− 1)2
h
(4)
Proof: Consider a directed (m,h)-CCN with m = h+1.
The high level idea of the proof will be to derive “top” and
“lower” layer constraints for this layered network and then
combine the two using Markovity relationships.
For an N -round protocol and 1 ≤ i ≤ h, let ZNi , Y Ni and
LNi denote the values sent on edge S → Si, Si → Ah+1 and
Si → Ai respectively. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let TNi denote the
values sent on edge Ai → Bi. Figure 3 illustrates the use of
notation for a directed (3,2)-CCN.
Top layer constraints :
(h− 1)N −H(W)
≥ I(WZN1 ;ZN2:h)−H(W)
(a)
= I(ZN1 ;Z
N
2:h) +H(W|ZN1 )−H(W)
(b)
= I(ZN1 ;Z
N
2:h)
3In addition to these examples, results for unicast in [8], [9] also show
feedback leads to a relaxation in connectivity requirements for secure message
transmission.
4We consider the case of directed CCNs with m > h as in the trivial
case of m = h the outer bound against a 1-node adversary is h − 1 and is
achievable using secure network coding [2].
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Fig. 3. A directed (3, 2)-CCN illustrating notation used for proof of
Theorem 1.
where (a) and (b) follow from decodability and secrecy
constraints. In general, for any i ∈ {1, 2, ...h} we have the
following result,
I(ZNi ; {ZNj }j 6=i) ≤ (h− 1)N −H(W) (5)
where {ZNj }j 6=i denotes the set {ZN1 , ZN2 ...ZNh } − {ZNi }.
Markovity :
I(LN1 Y
N
1 ;L
N
2:hY
N
2:h) ≤ I(Y N1 LN1 ZN1 ;Y N2:hLN2:hZN2:h)
(a)
= I(ZN1 ;Z
N
2:h) (6)
where (a) follows from Markov chains Y N2:hL
N
2:hZ
N
2:h →
ZN1 → Y N1 LN1 and Y N1 LN1 ZN1 → ZN2:h → Y N2:hLN2:h.
Similarly, I(LNi Y
N
i ; {LNj Y Nj }j 6=i) ≤ I(ZNi ; {ZNj }j 6=i).
Lower layer constraints :
H(W)
= I(W;LN1:h−1Y N1:h)
(a)
= I(W;LN1:h−1|Y N1:h)
≤
h−1∑
i=1
H(LNi |LN1:i−1Y N1:h)−H(LNi |LN1:i−1Y N1:hWLNi+1:h)
(b)
=
h−1∑
i=1
I(LNi ;L
N
i+1:h|LN1:i−1Y N1:h)
≤
h−1∑
i=1
I(LNi Y
N
i ; {LNj Y Nj }j 6=i)
(c)
≤
h−1∑
i=1
I(ZNi ; {ZNj }j 6=i)
(d)
≤ (h− 1)((h− 1)N −H(W))
where (a) follows from secrecy constraint at node Ah+1,
(b) follows from decodability constraint for the receiver not
connected to node Bi, (c) follows from Markov chains as
shown in (6) and (d) follows from the top layer constraints
(5). This completes the proof for m = h+ 1. The same outer
bound holds for any directed (m,h)-CCN with m > h due to
the presence of receivers used in the proof for m = h+1.
Lemma 1: Consider a directed (m,h)-CCN with a 1-node
adversary. There exist achievable schemes that are tight for
the cases (m,h = 2), (m = h+ 1, h) and (m ≤ 6, h = 3).
Proof: See Appendix.
For a directed (m, 2)-CCN, there exists an alternative op-
timal scheme (parts of which we will use in our feedback
schemes in Section V). It achieves secrecy rate h−12 in a
directed (m,h)-CCN with 1-node adversary. Described below,
this scheme uses additional keys which do not reach the
receivers and are cancelled at intermediate nodes5.
Key set cancellation (KSC) scheme: This is a 2-round
scheme.
1) In the first round, the source S sends keys
k1, k2, . . . , kh−1 to nodes S1, S2, . . . , Sh−1 respectively
and kh = −
∑h−1
i=1 ki to Sh.
2) In the second round, a secure network code [2] for
1-edge adversary is used with a slight modification
(described below) using keys from the first round. This
delivers h − 1 symbols to all receivers in the second
round and achieves secrecy rate h−12 over 2 rounds.
The modification mentioned in the second round is as follows.
Consider a secure network code [2] for a directed (m,h)-CCN
with 1-edge adversary. For this specific code, ∀j > h let Xji
and
∑h
i=1 a
j
iX
j
i be the values sent on edges Si → Aj and
Aj → Bj respectively. In the second round of KSC scheme,
we use this code with the modification that ∀j > h, Si sends
ajiX
j
i +ki to Aj (non-trivial coding node) instead of X
j
i . Node
Aj sums up all the values received from S1, S2, . . . , Sh (shown
in Figure 4) and sends
∑h
i=1 a
j
iX
j
i +
∑h
i=1 ki =
∑h
i=1 a
j
iX
j
i
to Bj . Hence the key set {k1, k2, . . . , kh} accumulated in the
first round is cancelled at all non-trivial coding nodes. The
key set ensures secrecy at every non-trivial coding node and
the underlying secure network code delivers h− 1 symbols to
all receivers.
S1 S2 Sh
A j
h
B j
a2
j X 2
j+k2
a1
j X 1
j+k1 ah
j X h
j−∑i=1
h−1
k i
∑i=1
h
ai
j X i
j
Fig. 4. Second round of KSC scheme.
V. UNDIRECTED AND BIDIRECTED CCN
In this section, we show that use of feedback can improve
secrecy rates for undirected and bidirected graphs. We prove
in particular the results for undirected and bidirected CCNs
that are summarized in Table I.
5This scheme is similar to achievability schemes in [4]. In addition to [4],
the approach of cancelling keys at intermediate nodes is also shown in [10].
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR 1-NODE ADVERSARY
(m,h)-CCN Multicast Multicast
type inner outer
bound bound
Directeda (h−1)
2
h
(h−1)2
h
Undirected (h− 1) (m−h+1)
(m−h+2) h− 1
Bidirected h− 1 h
aThe multicast inner bound shown for directed CCN is for
a limited number of cases described in Lemma 1.
A. Undirected CCN
An undirected CCN allows the usage of all edges in both
the directions. But it is still subject to the constraint that during
each round, we can use each edge only once (in any direction
that we intend to).
Theorem 2: Consider an undirected (m,h)-CCN with a 1-
node adversary. An outer bound for secrecy rate is h − 1.
Moreover, when6 m ≥ h + 1, there exists a scheme that
achieves secrecy rate (h− 1)m−h+1m−h+2 .
For the above scheme, as m → ∞, secrecy rate → h − 1.
This shows asymptotic optimality of the scheme. Additionally,
when m ≥ 2h− 1, the scheme achieves a secrecy rate strictly
better than the outer bound (h−1)
2
h for directed (m,h)-CCN.
Thus, feedback improves secrecy rates as we transition from
directed CCNs to undirected CCNs.
Proof: The outer bound proof is similar to (2) and follows
from a mincut comprising of h edges between a receiver and
nodes in {B1, B2, . . . , Bm}.
We now show a simple scheme for an undirected (m,h)-
CCN which achieves secrecy rate (h−1)m−h+1m−h+2 . The scheme
operates in two phases: uplink and downlink. It begins with
a single round uplink phase where keys are collected at
S1, S2, . . . , Sh as follows.
• Source S sends keys kS1 , k
S
2 , . . . , k
S
h−1 to
S1, S2, . . . , Sh−1 respectively and kSh = −
∑h−1
i=1 k
S
i to
Sh. This constitutes key set KS .
• The receiver connected to B1, B2, . . . , Bh sends keys
kR1 , k
R
2 , . . . , k
R
h−1 to S1, S2, . . . , Sh−1 respectively and
kRh = −
∑h−1
i=1 k
R
i to Sh. This constitutes key set KR.
• For i ∈ {h + 1, h + 2, . . . ,m}, Ai sends keys
kAi1 , k
Ai
2 , . . . , k
Ai
h−1 to S1, S2, . . . , Sh−1 respectively and
kAih = −
∑h−1
i=1 k
Ai
i to Sh. This constitutes key set KAi .
The uplink phase is followed by a downlink phase comprising
of (m−h+1) downlink rounds. Each round of the downlink
phase is similar to the second round of KSC scheme. The key
sets collected at S1, S2, . . . , Sh in the uplink phase are used as
part of one-time pad and cancelled at non-trivial coding nodes
(before they reach the receivers) in the following manner.
1) Key set KS is cancelled at all non-trivial coding nodes
in the first downlink round.
6In the trivial case of m = h, secrecy rate h−1 is achievable using secure
network coding [2].
2) Key set KR is cancelled at all non-trivial coding nodes
in the second downlink round.
3) For the next m−h−1 downlink rounds, a key set from
{KAi}i 6=j is cancelled at non-trivial coding node Aj .
Each downlink round delivers h− 1 symbols to all receivers.
A single round uplink phase is followed by (2 +m− h− 1)
downlink rounds and hence, the secrecy rate is (h−1)m−h+1m−h+2 .
B. Bidirected CCN
We now consider a bidirected CCN, which we create by
adding for every forward edge, one parallel edge (backward
edge) of the opposite directionality. Note that this does not
increase the mincut to the receivers.
Lemma 2: Consider a bidirected (m,h)-CCN with a 1-node
adversary. When m ≥ h + 1, there exists a scheme which
achieves secrecy rate h− 1.
Proof: A single round scheme achieves secrecy rate h−
1 as follows. The receiver connected to B1, B2, . . . , Bh first
sends keys kR1 , k
R
2 , . . . , k
R
h−1 to S1, S2, . . . , Sh−1 and k
R
h =
−∑h−1i=1 kRi to Sh. These keys are then cancelled at non-trivial
coding nodes (similar to the second round of KSC scheme)
and h−1 symbols delivered to each receiver in the same round.
Up to now we have focused on a 1-node adversary. Inter-
estingly, feedback using backward edges can help in the case
of edge-adversaries as well.
Lemma 3: For bidirected (m,h)-CCN, secrecy rate h is
achievable against a 1-edge adversary (taps only one directed
edge).
Proof: For every pair of nodes sharing an edge, a key
can be sent using the parallel backward edge. This key can
be used as a one-time pad to secure the network code on the
forward edge.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We first give an intuitive outline of the achievability schemes
followed by an illustrative example for directed (4, 3)-CCN.
The example is then extended to show schemes for the claimed
cases.
Intuitive outline: The scheme is based on the following
observation. If we reduce the indegree of non-trivial coding
nodes to 1, a secure network code [2] against 1-edge adversary
is sufficient to ensure secrecy. But reducing the indegree of
non-trivial coding nodes also reduces the mincut to some
receivers, hence the secrecy rate. Our approach is to have
a multiple round routing strategy, using a different subset of
edges in each round. We still restrict the indegree of non-trivial
coding nodes to 1 in each round, but ensure that the mincut
to each receiver averaged over multiple rounds is sufficient to
achieve the desired secrecy rate. This has connection to the
work in [11] on average throughput maximization (without
any secrecy constraints) using tree packing strategies. The
following example illustrates our approach for a directed
(4, 3)-CCN.
Example 1: Consider a directed (4, 3)-CCN with 4 re-
ceivers as shown in Figure 5. Let {c11, c12, c21, c22, c31, c32} be
the 6 symbol codeword derived from a 4 symbol message W
using a rate 23 erasure code. Let δ
1, δ2, δ3 be keys generated
by source S. We now describe a 3-round scheme that achieves
secrecy rate 43 (optimal for directed (4, 3)-CCN). In the first
round, S sends c11+ δ
1, c11+ c
1
2+ δ
1 and c11− c12+ δ1 to S1,S2
and S3 respectively7. Nodes S1, S2 and S3 send these values
to B1, B2 and B3 via A1, A2 and A3. For A4, S1 → A4 is
the only incoming edge used in this round and c11+ δ
1 is sent
from S1 to B4 via this edge. Each Bi now sends the received
values to the receivers connected to it. At the end of this round,
receivers R1 and R4 decode (c11, c
1
2). The other two receivers
decode only c12. In the second and third round, {c11, c12, δ1} are
replaced with {c21, c22, δ2} and {c31, c32, δ3} respectively with
the following change in routing strategy for A4. In the second
round, S2 → A4 is the only incoming edge used for A4 and
c21 + c
2
2 + δ
2 is sent along this edge. Hence, in the second
round receivers R1 and R3 decode (c21, c
2
2) and the other two
receivers decode c22. In the third round, S3 → A4 is the only
incoming edge used for A4 and c31 − c32 + δ3 is sent along
this edge. In this round, receivers R1 and R2 decode (c31, c
3
2)
and the other two receivers decode c32. At the end of 3 rounds,
7These linear combinations are such that c12 can be decoded from any two
combinations, while (c11, c
1
2) can be decoded using all three combinations.
all receivers decode at least 4 codeword symbols and hence
decode the message.
S1
S
S2 S3
A1 A2 A3
B1 B2 B3
R1 R2 R3
A4
B4
R4
Fig. 5. Directed (4, 3)-CCN.
Extension to (m ≤ 6, h = 3): In Example 1, the values
sent (over 3 rounds) on edges Ai → Bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m can
be listed in terms of TNi (defined in proof of Theorem 1, see
Figure 3)
(T 31 T
3
2 T
3
3 T
3
4 )
=
 c11 + δ1 c11 + c12 + δ1 c11 − c12 + δ1 c11 + δ1c21 + δ2 c21 + c22 + δ2 c21 − c22 + δ2 c21 + c22 + δ2
c31 + δ
3 c31 + c
3
2 + δ
3 c31 − c32 + δ3 c31 − c32 + δ3

Since the linear combinations used in each round are similar,
we denote ci1 + δ
i, ci1 + c
i
2 + δ
i, ci1 − ci2 + δi in round i by
routing symbols 0, 1, 2 respectively. In this notation,
(T 31 T
3
2 T
3
3 T
3
4 ) ≡
 0 1 2 00 1 2 1
0 1 2 2

= Rm=4,h=3,N=3 (7)
where Rm,h,N is a routing matrix listing the routing symbols
sent on edges Ai → Bi as defined above. With this notation,
we are now ready to compactly describe our optimal scheme
for (m = 6, h = 3). We simply extend Rm=4,h=3,N=3 to
Rm=6,h=3,N=3 by adding two columns as shown below.
Rm=6,h=3,N=3 =
 0 1 2 0 1 20 1 2 1 2 0
0 1 2 2 0 1
 (8)
Substituting back the values of 0, 1, 2 for every round, one
can easily check that every receiver (there are
(
6
3
)
receivers)
decodes at least 4 codeword symbols over 3 rounds and hence
the secrecy rate is 43 (optimal).
Extension to (m,h = 2) based on Hadamard code:
Let m = 2N (if m is odd, simply consider a directed
(m + 1, h = 2)-CCN and proceed8). Let {c1, c2, . . . , cN} be
the N symbol codeword derived from a N2 symbol message
8The set of receivers in a directed (m+1, h)-CCN includes the receivers in
a directed (m,h)-CCN; hence it is sufficient to show a scheme for (m+1,h).
using a rate 12 erasure code. In addition, the source generates
keys δ1, . . . , δN . We will now describe an N -round scheme
which achieves secrecy rate 12 . In round i, we denote c
i + δi,
δi by routing symbols 0, 1 respectively. In round i, the source
sends 0, 1 to S1,S2 respectively and these get forwarded to
B1, B2. This fixes the first two columns (corresponding to
TN1 and T
N
2 ) of routing matrix Rm=2N,h=2,N as the all
0 column vector and all 1 column vector respectively. The
routing symbols sent on A3 → B3, . . . , Am → Bm over N
rounds are derived from a Hadamard code as follows. Consider
2N Hadamard codewords (in terms of routing symbols 0, 1) of
length N such that the all 0 and all 1 codewords are present
in this collection (this can be easily done using Sylvester’s
construction). We assign these 2N codewords as the 2N
columns of Rm=2N,h=2,N such that the all 0 codeword is
the first column and the all 1 codeword is the second column.
The N -round schemes follows this routing matrix (the values
sent on edges Ai → Bi) and at the end of every round,
B1, . . . , Bh+1 forward the received values to all the receivers
connected to them. Since the Hamming distance between any
two column vectors in Rm=2N,h=2,N is at least9 N2 , each
receiver receives both 0, 1 (i.e., ci + δi, δi ) in at least N2
rounds. Hence it can decode at least N2 codeword symbols
and thus the message.
Extension to (m = h + 1, h): The scheme in Exam-
ple 1 can be extended for the case (h + 1, h) as follows.
Let {c11, c12 . . . , c1h−1, c21, . . . , c2h−1, . . . , ch1 , . . . , chh−1} be the
(h − 1)h symbol codeword derived from a (h − 1)2 symbol
message using a rate h−1h erasure code. The source computes{xi1, . . . , xih−1} from {ci1, . . . cih−1} using an invertible linear
transformation defined below.
cij =
h−1∑
l=1
xil − xij (9)
In addition to the above steps, the source generates keys
δ1, . . . , δh. We now describe an h-round scheme that achieves
secrecy rate (h−1)
2
h . In round i, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i−1, xij+δi is sent
from S to Sj and for i+1 ≤ j ≤ h, xij−1+δi is sent to Sj . For
j = i,
∑h−1
l=1 x
i
l+ δ
i is sent to Si. These values are forwarded
by S1, . . . , Sh to B1, . . . , Bh respectively via A1, . . . , Ah.
Also, Si → Ah+1 is the only incoming edge used for Ah+1
in round i and using this edge
∑h−1
l=1 x
i
l + δ
i is forwarded
to Bh+1 via Ah+1. At the end of every round, B1, . . . , Bh+1
forward the received values to all the receivers connected to
them. In round i, only two receivers can decode h−1 codeword
symbols, i.e., {ci1, . . . , cih−1} (they are the receivers connected
to {B1, . . . , Bh} and {B1, . . . , Bh+1}−{Bi}). The remaining
h−1 receivers can decode only h−2 codeword symbols from
{ci1, . . . , cih−1}. Hence over h rounds, all receivers can decode
at least (h−1)(h−2)+(h−1) = (h−1)2 codeword symbols
and achieve secrecy rate (h−1)
2
h .
9Property of Hadamard code.
